We report on Krum, the rst provably Byzantine-tolerant aggregation rule for distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). Krum guarantees the convergence of SGD even in a distributed setting where (asymptotically) up to half of the workers can be malicious adversaries trying to attack the learning system.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing amount of data involved as well as the growing complexity of models has led to learning schemes that require a lot of computational resources. As a consequence, most industry-grade machine-learning implementations are now distributed [1] . For example, as of 2012, Google reportedly used 16.000 processors to train an image classi er [8] . However, distributing a computation over several machines induces a higher risk of failures, including crashes and computation errors. In the worst case, the system may undergo Byzantine failures [5] , i.e., completely arbitrary behaviors of some of the machines involved. In practice, such failures may be due to stalled processes, or biases in the way the data samples are distributed among the processes.
A classical approach to mask failures in distributed systems is to use a state machine replication protocol [11] , which requires however state transitions to be applied by all processes. In the case of distributed machine learning, this constraint can be seen in two ways: either (a) the processes agree on a sample of data based on which they update their local parameter vectors, or (b) they agree on how the parameter vector should be updated. In case (a), the sample of data has to be transmitted to each process, which then has to perform a heavyweight computation to update its local parameter vector. This entails communication and computational costs that defeat the entire purpose of distributing the work. In case (b), the processes have no way to check if the chosen update for the parameter vector has indeed been computed correctly on real data (a Byzantine process could have proposed the update). Byzantine failures may easily prevent the convergence of the learning algorithm. Neither of these solutions is satisfactory in a realistic distributed machine learning setting.
In fact, most learning algorithms today rely on a core component, namely stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [4] . In a machine learning setting, a cost function -depending on the parameter vector -is minimized based on stochastic estimates of its gradient. Distributed implementations of SGD [12] typically take the following form: a single parameter server is in charge of updating the parameter vector, while worker processes perform the actual update estimation, based on the share of data they draw from un unknown distribution. The parameter server executes synchronous rounds, during each of which, the parameter vector is broadcast to the workers. In turn, each worker computes an estimate of the update to apply (an estimate of the gradient), and the parameter server aggregates their results to nally update the parameter vector. Today, this aggregation is typically implemented through averaging [10] , or variants of it [6, 12] .
The motivation of this work is the question of how a distributed SGD can be devised to tolerate f Byzantine processes among the n workers. We provide the rst provable answer to this question.
Contributions. We rst show that no linear combination (current approaches) of the updates proposed by the workers can tolerate a single Byzantine worker. A non-linear, distance-based choice function, that chooses, among the proposed vectors, the vector "closest to everyone else" (for example by taking the vector that minimizes the sum of the distances to every other vector), might look appealing. Yet, such a distance-based choice tolerates only a single Byzantine worker. Two Byzantine workers can collude, one helping the other to be selected, by moving the barycenter of all the vectors farther from the "correct area". We formulate a Byzantine resilience property capturing su cient conditions for the parameter server's choice to tolerate f Byzantine workers. Essentially, to guarantee that the cost will decrease despite Byzantine workers, we require the parameter server's choice (a) to point, on average, to the same direction as the gradient and (b) to have statistical moments (up to the fourth moment) bounded above by a homogeneous polynomial in the moments of a correct estimator of the gradient. One way to ensure such a resilience property is to consider a majority-based approach, looking at every subset of n − f vectors, and considering the subset with the smallest diameter. While this approach is more robust to Byzantine workers that propose vectors far from the correct area, its exponential computational cost is prohibitive. Interestingly, combining the intuitions of the majority-based and distance-based methods, we can choose the vector that is somehow the closest to its n − f neighbors. Namely, the one that minimizes a distance-based criteria, but only within its n − f neighbors. This is the main idea behind our choice function we call Krum 1 . We show (using techniques from multi-dimensional stochastic calculus) that our Krum function satis es the resilience property aforementioned and the corresponding machine learning scheme converges. An important advantage of the Krum function is that it requires O (n 2 · d ) local computation time, where d is the dimension of the parameter vector. This contrasts with the prohibitive O (n d ) cost of approximate agreement [9] . (In deep learning, the dimension d of the parameter vector may take values in the hundreds of billions.)
MODEL
We consider a general distributed system consisting of a parameter server 2 [1] , and n workers, f of them possibly Byzantine. Computation is divided into (in nitely many) synchronous rounds. During round t, the parameter server broadcasts its parameter vector x t ∈ R d to all the workers. Each correct worker p computes an estimate V t p = G (x t , ξ t p ) of the gradient ∇Q (x t ) of the cost function Q, where ξ t p is a random variable representing, e.g., the sample drawn from the dataset. A Byzantine worker b proposes a vector V t b which can be arbitrary (see Figure 1) . The parameter server computes a vector F (V t 1 , . . . , V t n ) by applying a deterministic function F to the vectors received. We refer to F as the choice function of the parameter server. The parameter server updates the parameter vector using the following SGD equation:
We assume that the correct (non-Byzantine) workers compute unbiased estimates of the gradient ∇Q (x t ). More precisely, in every round t, the vectors V t i 's proposed by the correct workers are independent identically distributed random vectors,
. This can be achieved by ensuring that each sample of data used for computing the gradient is drawn uniformly and independently, as classically assumed in the literature of machine learning [3] . The Byzantine workers have full knowledge of the system, including the choice function F , the vectors proposed by the other workers and can collaborate with each other [7] .
1 Krum, in Greek Κρούµος, was a Bulgarian Khan of the end of the eighth century, who undertook o ensive attacks against the Byzantine empire. Bulgaria doubled in size during his reign. 2 The parameter server is assumed to be reliable. Classical techniques of state-machine replication can be used to avoid this single point of failure.
BYZANTINE RESILIENCE
In most SGD-based learning algorithms used today [3, 4] , the choice function consists in computing the average of the input vectors. 
where the λ i 's are non-zero scalars. Let U be any vector in R d . A single Byzantine worker can make F always select U . In particular, a single Byzantine worker can prevent convergence.
Intuitively, the choice function should output a vector F that is not too far from the "real" gradient , more precisely, the vector that points to the steepest direction of the cost function being optimized. This is expressed as a lower bound (condition (i)) on the scalar product of the (expected) vector F and . If EF belongs to the ball centered at with radius r , then the scalar product is bounded below by a term involving sin α = r / . Condition (ii) is more technical, and states that the moments of F should be controlled by the moments of the (correct) gradient estimator G. The bounds on the moments of G are classically used to control the e ects of the discrete nature of the SGD dynamics [3] . Condition (ii) allows to transfer this control to the choice function.
De nition 3.2 ((α, f )-Byzantine Resilience). Let 0 ≤ α < π /2 be any angular value, and any integer 0 ≤ f ≤ n. Let V 1 , . . . , V n be any independent identically distributed random vectors in R d , V i ∼ G, with EG = . Let B 1 , . . . , B f be any random vectors in
2 > 0 and (ii) for r = 2, 3, 4, E F r is bounded above by a linear combination of terms E G r 1 . . . E G r n−1 with r 1 + · · · + r n−1 = r .
THE KRUM FUNCTION
The barycentric choice function F bar = 1 n n i=1 V i can be de ned as the vector in R d that minimizes the sum of squared distances
. Lemma 3.1, however, states that this approach does not tolerate even a single Byzantine failure. One could try to de ne the choice function in order to select, among the V i 's, the vector U ∈ {V 1 , . . . , V n } that minimizes the sum i U − V i 2 . Intuitively, vector U would be close to every proposed vector, including the correct ones, and thus would be Session 9 PODC'17, July 25-27, 2017, Washington, DC, USA close to the "real" gradient. However, all Byzantine workers but one may propose vectors that are large enough to move the total barycenter far away from the correct vectors, while the remaining Byzantine worker proposes this barycenter. Since the barycenter always minimizes the sum of squared distance, this last Byzantine worker is certain to have its vector chosen by the parameter server. This situation is depicted in Figure 2 . In other words, since this choice function takes into account all the vectors, including the very remote ones, the Byzantine workers can collude to force the choice of the parameter server.
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Figure 2: Selecting the vector that minimizes the sum of the squared distances to other vectors does not prevent arbitrary vectors proposed by Byzantine workers from being selected if f ≥ 2. If the gradients computed by the correct workers lie in area C, the Byzantine workers can collude to propose up to f − 1 vectors in an arbitrarily remote area B, thus allowing another Byzantine vector b, close to the barycenter of proposed vectors, to be selected.
Our approach to circumvent this issue is to preclude the vectors that are too far away. More precisely, we de ne our Krum choice function K (V 1 , . . . , V n ) as follows. For any i j, we denote by i → j the fact that V j belongs to the n − f − 2 closest vectors to V i . Then, we de ne for each worker i, the score s (i) = i→j V i − V j 2 where the sum runs over the n − f − 2 closest vectors to V i . Finally, K (V 1 , . . . , V n ) = V i * where i * refers to the worker minimizing the score,
Resilience. Proposition 4.2 below states that, if 2f + 2 < n and the gradient estimator is accurate enough, (its standard deviation is relatively small compared to the norm of the gradient), then the Krum function is (α, f )-Byzantine-resilient, where angle α depends on the ratio of the deviation over the gradient. When the Krum function selects a correct vector (i.e., a vector proposed by a correct worker), the proof of this fact is relatively easy, since the probability distribution of this correct vector is that of the gradient estimator G. The core di culty occurs when the Krum function selects a Byzantine vector (i.e., a vector proposed by a Byzantine worker), because the distribution of this vector is completely arbitrary, and may even depend on the correct vectors. In a very general sense, this part of our proof is reminiscent of the geometric median technique and is discussed in details in the full paper [2] . P 4.2. Let V 1 , . . . , V n be any independent and identically distributed random d-dimensional vectors s.t V i ∼ G, with EG = and E G − 2 = dσ 2 . Let B 1 , . . . , B f be any f random vectors,
